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Abstract
A recent paper by Kraay (2003) documents the lack of any systematic association
between monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack. This paper extends
Kraay’s work by introducing an improved measure of monetary policy and an additional
country-speciﬁc fundamental, short-term corporate debt, to capture balance sheet vul-
nerabilities emphasized by the recent currency crises literature. The results show that
for low levels of short-term corporate debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability
of a successful attack. This eﬀect decreases and eventually reverses for higher levels
of debt. These ﬁndings contrast earlier empirical evidence and imply a fundamental
reconsideration of the role of monetary policy during currency crises.
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During the last thirty years, both developed and developing countries with ﬁxed exchange-rate
regimes have suﬀered signiﬁcantly from speculative attacks against their currencies. To prevent
such attacks from developing into currency crises, academics and policymakers around the world
have been investigating the appropriate policy responses. In this context, an important question
is whether a monetary policy tightening could help a country protect a ﬁxed exchange rate.
The conventional wisdom argues that an increase in interest rates could help a country defend
its exchange rate by making it prohibitively expensive for speculators to take short positions in the
currency under attack. Moreover, higher interest rates could also signal the monetary authority’s
commitment to the ﬁxed exchange rate, which could further avert speculation. In the aftermath
of the Asian crises, however, this view has come under scrutiny. Critics argue that raising interest
rates could be a self-defeating strategy because of the harm it inﬂicts on the economy– often
aggravating the very problems that motivated speculation in the ﬁrst place. As the costs of higher
interest rates mount, the monetary authority’s signal becomes less credible, raising devaluation
expectations, and thus intensifying speculative pressures. Hence, depending on the economy’s
ability to withstand the adverse eﬀects of higher interest rates, the eﬀorts of the monetary authority
might increase, rather than decrease, the probability of a successful attack.1
A recent paper by Kraay (2003)–published in this Journal– investigates the existence of
such non-linear eﬀects of monetary policy. The study employs a large cross-section of speculative
attacks and several episode-speciﬁc fundamentals (i.e., the recent occurrence of a banking crisis,
exchange rate overvaluation, the level of international reserves, the external payments position,
and the business cycle), but fails to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect.2
This paper builds on Kraay and extends his work in two ways. First, we construct an improved
measure of the response of monetary policy by documenting the most appropriate episode-speciﬁc
indicator of monetary policy and experimenting with alternative timings. Second, we introduce
short-term debt as an additional factor that might aﬀect the ability of monetary policy to defend a
1Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) formalize these devaluation spirals, while Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Radelet
and Sachs (1998) provide an extensive discussion of why higher interest rates might increase the probability of
a devaluation. More recently, Lahiri and Vegh (2003) and Flood and Jeanne (2005) incorporated some of these
channels–the unsustainability of public debt– in ‘ﬁrst generation’ models of currency crises.
2This result mirrors the mixed ﬁndings in the rest of the empirical literature (e.g., Basurto and Ghosh (2001),
Caporale et al. (2005), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Gould and Kamin (2001), and Zettelmeyer (2004)). Some ofthese
studies ﬁnd that monetary policy decreases the probability of a successful attack, others ﬁnd the opposite, while some
ﬁnd no eﬀect. Most of these studies, however, focus on the experiences of a handful of diﬀerent countries. Hence,
if the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy depends on the country-speciﬁc circumstances, these seemingly conﬂicting
results are probably not surprising.
1ﬁxed exchange rate. Interest rate defenses are usually short-lived, intended to buy the government
some time to correct the imbalances that triggered the speculation. They could, however, have
important real implications if a country has high levels of short-term debt. Higher interest rates
increase the service cost of debt, erode the borrower’s net worth, and thus make it more diﬃcult
for borrowers to meet their current debt obligations or to roll-over their short-term debt. As a
result, a monetary tightening may actually increase the probability of devaluation.
To test this hypothesis, we constructed a large cross-section of speculative attacks from 1986
to 2002 using Kraay’s methodology. To approximate a country’s short-term debt, we use data on
short-term corporate debt, given that data on short-term public debt are not publicly available.
This is not a such big caveat, since the private sector is much more sensitive to short-term changes
in interest rates than most governments (i.e., it is more likely that a ﬁrm will be credit-rationed
or go bankrupt than a government). The results conﬁrm that the eﬃcacy of monetary policy
in defending a ﬁxed exchange rate depends on short-term debt. For low levels of short-term
debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability of a successful attack. This eﬀect decreases and
eventually reverses for higher levels of debt. Our ﬁndings also suggest that the way monetary
policy is measured plays an important role for the results and the model’s goodness of ﬁt. Finally,
our results are robust to a wide range of robustness checks, including additional non-linear eﬀects,
alternative deﬁnitions of short-term debt, and an alternative classiﬁcation of ﬁxed exchange rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the methodology and the
data. Section three discusses our main ﬁndings, describes various robustness checks, and deals
with concerns of endogeneity of monetary policy. Section four concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
The probability of a successful speculative attack is analyzed using a Probit model as follows:
P(Yi,t =1 )=F(β0 +β1Xi,t−k +β2Zi,t−k +β3X 
i,t−kZi,t−k)+ i,t, (1)
where F(.) is the standard normal distribution. Yi,t is equal to one if during month t there was a
successful speculative attack in country i, and is equal to zero if there was a failed attack. Xi,t−k is
an indicator that captures the response of monetary policy to speculative pressures, where k>0.
Matrix Zi,t−k includes episode-speciﬁc fundamentals that are expected to aﬀect the outcome of
a speculative attack (e.g., the level of international reserves, the growth rate of real GDP, short-
term corporate debt). The interaction term between Xi,t−k and Zi,t−k captures how the eﬀect
2of monetary policy changes for diﬀerent levels of fundamentals. The paper’s central hypothesis
is tested using the interaction between monetary policy and short-term corporate debt. Next, we
discuss how the key components of equation (1) have been constructed.
2.1 Identifying episodes of speculative attacks
The dependent variable Yi,t is constructed following the methodology developed by Kraay (2003).
A successful attack is deﬁned as a situation where a large nominal depreciation was preceded
by a relatively ﬁxed nominal exchange rate.3 A failed attack, instead, is deﬁned as a situation
where there were downward spikes in reserves or upward spikes in the spread (between the short-
term interest rates in the home country and the anchor country) that occurred during periods of
relatively ﬁxed exchange rates and were not followed by a devaluation for at least three months.
This methodology was applied on a sample of countries for which data on short-term corporate
debt and monetary policy (our key variables) were available. Table 1 reports the resulting list of
episodes during the sample period 1986:1 to 2002:12. From 1986 to 1999–the common sample
period with Kraay– our results are exactly the same.4 For the remaining period up to 2002,
we identiﬁed ten more episodes, four of which were successful. In total, we have 55 episodes of
speculative attacks: 21 successful and 34 failed attacks.
2 . 2 M e a s u r i n gt h er e s p o n s eo fm o n e t a r yp o l i c y
Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the literature as to which variable captures best the stance
of monetary policy. Over the years, several indicators have been proposed, most of which are
short-term interest rates (e.g., discount rates, interbank rates). Any given interest rate, however,
is only a noisy signal of monetary policy.5 Hence, there is a great deal of disagreement as to which
variable captures best the stance of monetary policy. Kraay, for example, argues that discount
rates, compared to other interest rates, are less noisy since they are under the direct control
of the monetary authorities. Hence, he uses the discount rate for every episode in his sample.
3Following Kraay, we do not require the exchange rate to be perfectly ﬁxed prior to the attack, in order to be
able to identify episodes in which narrow target zones or tightly-managed crawling pegs were abandoned. In the
sensitivity analysis, we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative deﬁnitions of ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes using the classiﬁcation of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
4The episodes that we identiﬁed for the sub-period 1986 to 1999 were previously identiﬁed by Kraay, and our
timing and classiﬁcation (i.e., successful or failed) is the same. Compared to Kraay, our sample is smaller: Kraay
has 192 episodes, while we only have 55. The number of episodes in our sample is mainly constrained by data
availability of short-term corporate debt, our key variable. Later on, however, we show that the key properties of
Kraay’s sample hold for our sub-sample as well.
5Variations in short-term interest rates can arise from any factor that inﬂuences the market for the underlying
asset, and thus do not necessarily reﬂect changes in monetary policy.
3Alternatively, Goldfajn and Gupta (2003) argue that “discount rates tend to remain ﬂat and often
do not reﬂect short run tight policies”. They mention, as an example, the 500% increase in the
Swedish interest rates in September 1992, which was not reﬂected at all in the discount rate.
Choosing the “best indicator” of monetary policy in a cross-country analysis is very diﬃcult as
the most “appropriate” indicator is not necessarily the same across countries and time.6 To deal
with this problem, we collected information on the most appropriate indicator for each episode in
our sample using information from: i) the websites of the monetary authorities (i.e., we searched
for stated “targets” of monetary policy), ii) direct contact with the monetary authorities, and iii)
other empirical studies. The resulting list of instruments consists of various short-term interest
rates. Most of them are interbank rates, and only a few of them are discount rates. Table 2 reports
the instrument that was identiﬁed as the best indicator of monetary policy for each episode. They
are all short-term interest rates. Most of them are interbank rates, and only a few are discount
rates.
Using the interest rates in Table 2 (our indicator) and the discount rates (Kraay’s indicator)
as the underlying indicators of monetary policy we create two alternative measures of the response
of monetary policy to speculative pressures. This step, however, involves some controversial
assumptions about the timing of speculative pressures and the outcome of an attack. Kraay, for
example, takes the change in the stance of monetary policy in the month in which speculative
pressures peak. For successful attacks, he assumes that speculative pressures peak in the month
prior to the large devaluation. Hence, he calculates the change in the interest rate spreads between
t − 1 and t − 2. For failed attacks, he assumes that pressures peak in month t and thus takes the
diﬀerence between t and t −1. Kraay’s indicator is therefore calculated as follows:
Xi,t−k =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
(si,t−1 − si,t−2) if Yi,t =1
(si,t −si,t−1) if Yi,t =0 ,
(2)
where t is the month of the attack, si,t is the diﬀerence between the real interest rate that captures
the stance of monetary policy in country i at time t and the corresponding interest rate of the
anchor country.7 Applying equation (2), we get two alternative measures: one using the episode-
speciﬁc interest rates, MP1, and another using the discount rates, DISC1.
We also experiment with modiﬁed versions of equation (2). The ﬁrst modiﬁcation uses an
6The instruments of the various central banks are not necessarily the same. Hence, the most appropriate
indicators of monetary policy can also diﬀer.
7Using the spread of real interest rates removes variations from changes in inﬂation rates and changes in the
anchor country’s interest rates (or monetary policy). The nominal rates are deﬂated using the consumer price index,
taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The discount rates are also taken from the IFS.
4alternative timing, and the second uses the percentage change in the spread, as opposed to the
change. Both of these modiﬁcations are discussed in turn below. In particular, when there is a
successful attack at time t, speculative pressures probably peak sometime between t and t − 1.
Given the monthly frequency of the data and the fact that it takes some time before changes in
monetary policy aﬀect the exchange rate, it is not unreasonable to use the change in the spread
between t−1 and t−2. Moreover, using the diﬀerence between t and t−1 w o u l dh a v eb e e nm o r e
problematic, since the spread at t might already reﬂect the response of monetary policy after the
devaluation. For failed attacks, Kraay assumes that pressures peak in month t, and thus takes the
diﬀerence between t and t−1. For sensitivity, however, it would be useful to also experiment with
the diﬀerence between t − 1 and t − 2. If one believes that it takes some time before monetary
policy has an impact on the exchange rate, then monetary authorities would be most eﬀective if
they act before speculation reaches its peak (i.e., when Kraay’s procedure identiﬁes a speculative
attack). Hence, we create two more measures, MP2 and DISC2,a sf o l l o w s :
Xi,t−k = si,t−1 − si,t−2. (3)
Finally, the percentage change in the spread, instead of the change, might be more appropriate
if one wants to capture the extent to which monetary policy tightens. For example, an increase
in the interest rate from 1% to 11% is not equivalent to an increase from 10% to 20%.U s i n g
modiﬁed versions of equations (2) and (3), where the change in the spread is replaced with the
percentage change, we create four additional measures:   MP1,  DISC1,   MP2,a n d  DISC2.8 When
these measures are used, the initial level of the spread is also included as a control variable.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 3 reports correlations between the various indicators of monetary
policy. If we only change the underlying interest rate that is used to calculate the spread, then the
correlations between the resulting measures are quite high (e.g., see correlation between MP1 and
DISC1). Alternatively, if we only change the timing over which we calculate the change in the
spread, then the correlations between the measures are signiﬁcantly lower than those where the only
diﬀerence is the underlying interest rate (e.g., see correlation between MP1 and MP2). Using the
percentage change, as opposed to the change, in the spread results in even lower correlations (e.g.,
see correlation between MP1 and   MP1). Hence, combining a diﬀerent timing and the percentage
change results in very low correlations (e.g., see correlation between MP1 and   MP2).
The second panel of Table 3 provides summary statistics for each measure. Comparing the
8The notation is similar to the one introduced above: index 1 refers to the timing introduced by Kraay, index 2
refers to our alternative timing, and the symbol  is used to denote percentage changes.
5ﬁrst four measures reveals that monetary policy is more responsive when spreads are calculated
using the episode-speciﬁc interest rates, instead of the discount rates (i.e., the average change in
the spread and the standard deviation are much larger for MP1 and MP2 than for DISC1 and
DISC2), consistent with Goldfajn and Gupta’s argument. When the percentage change in the
spread is used, the indicators using the discount rates are more responsive, suggesting that the
initial spreads are larger when they are calculated using the episode-speciﬁc interest rates. Finally,
our alternative timing captures more variation in monetary policy than Kraay’s timing (e.g., the
means and standard deviations of   MP1 and  DISC1 are larger than those of   MP2 and  DISC2).
The third panel of Table 3 provides a simple classiﬁcation between the response of monetary
policy and the outcome of an attack. For each outcome, we report the number of attacks and the
fraction for which monetary policy tightened. Regardless of which measure is used, the results
suggest that monetary policy tightens equally often during successful and failed attacks. This is
in line with Kraay’s ﬁndings on a much larger sample, suggesting that our sub-sample is similar
to Kraay’s with respect to the outcome of an attack and the response of monetary policy.
2.3 Episode-speciﬁc fundamentals
To estimate equation (1), we include a number of episode-speciﬁc fundamentals that are expected
to aﬀect the outcome of a speculative attack. These variables–with the exception of short-term
corporate debt– are taken from previous studies. Four indicators are taken from Kraay: the
growth rate of the real exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, reserves to imports, IMF
loans to quota, and deviations from GDP trend. Apart from Kraay’s indicators we also included
two variables that were previously found to be statistically signiﬁcant in at least two studies:
the current account balance to GDP and the growth rate of exports.9 All variables are included
with lags and were taken either from the IFS or the World Development Indicators, depending on
availability. The corresponding studies provide detailed deﬁnitions for each indicator.
To capture the degree to which a country’s corporate sector is leveraged, we use the “represen-
tative” ﬁrm’s ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The data were obtained from the Worldscope
database, which contains ﬁnancial information for a large number of publicly listed companies in
developed and emerging markets. The short-term debt variable is deﬁned as the portion of debt
payable within a year, including the sinking fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures.
The information is provided annually at the level of the individual companies. Using this informa-
9Our selection was based on a review article by Lestano et al. (2003).
6tion, we constructed a measure of the degree to which a country’s corporate sector is leveraged,
by taking the average of the individual short-term debt to total assets ratios the year before the
attack.10 Figure 1a shows the resulting debt ratios for each episode in our sample. As can be
seen in Figure 1a there is no systematic relationship between the outcome of a speculative attack
and the level of short-term debt. In fact, the average short-term debt ratio is equal to 13.28% for
successful attacks and 12.26% for failed attacks. The corresponding standard deviations are 5.54%
and 4.63%, suggesting that the small diﬀerence in these ratios is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, the Worldscope database contains two additional debt ratios: long-term debt to total
assets and total debt to total assets, where long-term debt is equal to the portion of debt that is
due in more than a year and total debt is equal to the sum of short-term and long-term debt. Using
these ratios, in the same way as the short-term debt ratios, we constructed two additional indicators
of corporate indebtedness. These additional indicators are used in the sensitivity analysis to show
that what matters is not debt in general, but its short-term component.
3R e s u l t s
Table 4 provides estimation results from a benchmark speciﬁcation of equation (1) with no inter-
action terms. The eight columns of Table 4 correspond to our alternative indicators of monetary
policy, where DISC1 is Kraay’s indicator and   MP2 is our preferred indicator. For each regressor
we report the estimated coeﬃcient from a Probit model, its standard error, and the change in the
probability of a successful attack if the corresponding regressor increases by one standard deviation
from its sample mean (i.e., the marginal eﬀect of each coeﬃcient).11 A sc a nb es e e ni nT a b l e4 ,w e
fail to ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of monetary policy on the outcome of a speculative
attack. None of the eight indicators of monetary policy yields a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
This result is consistent with Kraay’s ﬁndings in similar speciﬁcations (see Table 3 in Kraay).
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that our sub-sample has properties similar to those of Kraay’s, and
that Kraay’s benchmark results are robust to our alternative indicators of monetary policy.
Although most control variables enter with the expected sign, they are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, and should be viewed with caution. The only exception is the ratio of IMF loans to quota.
10For example, ifan attack takes place sometime during 1996, we use the ratios of December 1995. In the sensitivity
analysis, we introduce alternative timings (e.g., using a combination of a one and a two-year lag, depending on the
timing of an attack during a given year) and alternative speciﬁcations (e.g., a median or a weighted average).
11The standard errors of the marginal eﬀects are calculated using the Delta method. Hence, the statistical
signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient can be diﬀerent from the statistical signiﬁcance of the marginal eﬀect.
Finally, at the bottom of each column we report the probability of a successful attack if all regressors are set at
their sample mean, P0, so that the marginal eﬀects can also be expressed in percentage terms.
7This indicator is signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations and enters with a positive sign, suggesting that
diﬃculties in obtaining extra funding, increase the probability of a successful attack. This eﬀect is
not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also economically relevant. Depending on the speciﬁcation, an
increase in this ratio by one standard deviation (i.e., by 5%) leads to an increase in the probability
of a successful attack by 41% to 83%. The level of short-term debt to total assets enters with a
positive sign in most speciﬁcations, indicating that, ceteris paribus, a higher level of short-term
debt to total assets increases the probability of a successful attack. Deviations from GDP trend
always enter with negative signs, indicating that during periods of economic slowdown or reces-
sions there is a larger probability of a successful attack. The current account balance enters with
a negative sign in most speciﬁcations, which implies that a higher current account deﬁcit increases
the probability of a successful attack.12 T h es i g n so ft h ec o e ﬃ c i e n t sf o rt h ei n i t i a ll e v e lo ft h e
spread and reserves to total imports are mixed, whereas the real exchange rate growth and the
growth rate of exports do not have the expected signs in most speciﬁcations.
As expected given the results above, the model’s goodness of ﬁt is rather poor (see bottom of
Table 4). In particular, the pseudo R-squared is quite low and the model has a high probability
of predicting a failed attack, even when an attack is successful (i.e., on average, 44% of successful
attacks is wrongly classiﬁed as a failed attack). Given that most independent variables are not
statistically signiﬁcant, the model is biased towards predicting a failed attack.
To investigate whether the eﬀect of monetary policy depends on the level of short-term debt, in
Table 5 we allow for an interaction term between the indicators of monetary policy and short-term
debt. Overall, the results conﬁrm our prior expectations. We ﬁnd that an increase in interest rates
leads to a decrease in the probability of a successful attack, although the extent to which this is
true depends on the level of short-term debt. The higher the level of short-term debt, the lower
the probability that a given increase in interest rates will defend the currency under attack.
It should be emphasized that this result depends on the way we measure the response of
monetary policy. The relevant coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant only when  DISC2 and   MP2
are used. This suggests that using the percentage change (as opposed to the change in the spread)
and our timing (as opposed to Kraay’s timing) is very important. Using our country-speciﬁc
interest rates (as opposed to the discount rate) is also important, since it increases the statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of interest from 5% to 1%, and it improves signiﬁcantly the model’s
goodness of ﬁt. Although the pseudo R-squared is already much higher for  DISC2, the model’s
12In some cases, the marginal eﬀects are signiﬁcant at 10%,e v e nt h o u g ht h ee s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃ c i e n t sa r ei n s i g n i ﬁ c a n t .
These are cases in which the p-values of the coeﬃcients are slightly above the 10% cut-oﬀ point.
8ability to distinguish between a successful and a failed attack increases signiﬁcantly when   MP2 is
used (i.e., both types I and II errors are relatively small when   MP2 is used).
All in all, the results in Table 5 show that if we allow for the possibility that it takes some
time for monetary policy to have an eﬀect, and if we use the percentage change in the spread as
an indicator of monetary policy, we ﬁnd strong evidence of a non-linear eﬀect of monetary policy
on the outcome of a speculative attack. Figure 1b depicts this eﬀect graphically. According to our
estimates, for levels of short-term debt that are equal to or less than 13%, a tightening of monetary
policy decreases the probability of a successful attack. Instead, for levels of short-term debt that
are equal to or higher than 16%, a tightening of monetary policy increases the probability that an
attack will succeed. For all numbers in-between, the two channels of monetary policy cancel each
other out and thus lead to a statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
These results support the argument that interest rate defenses are not credible if short-term
debt is high, since speculators realize that the high interest rates cannot be maintained without
devastating eﬀects. Underlying this argument is the notion that it is short-term debt that renders
interest rate defenses ineﬀective or even counterproductive, and not debt in general. To test this
distinction, using our main speciﬁcation with   MP2, we replaced short-term debt with total debt
and afterwards with long-term debt. The results are presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table
6. In particular, when total debt is used we obtain results similar to those presented earlier using
short-term debt, although the interaction term is signiﬁcant at 5%,a so p p o s e dt o1%.W h e n
long-term debt is used the results break down (i.e., both coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant), suggesting
that what matters is not debt in general, but its short-term component.
We also subjected our results to a number of robustness checks. First, we allowed for interaction
terms between monetary policy and the other episode-speciﬁc fundamentals, with and without the
short-term debt interaction. Even without the debt interaction, none of the other fundamentals
yield any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, consistent with Kraay’s ﬁndings. When the debt interaction
is included, our main result is unchanged and none of the other variables resulted in any statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Second, we experimented with alternative deﬁnitions of the short-term debt
ratios. Our results are robust to using the median or a weighted average of the individual ratios as
well as alternative timings (a “two-year lag” or a combination of one and two-year lags depending
on the timing of the attack during a given year).13 Finally, we also reconstructed our dataset using
13For the weighted average measure, we weigh the various ﬁrms using their ratios of total debt to total assets.
Everything else equal, highly leveraged ﬁrms (i.e., with high levels of total debt relative to their size) are more likely
to default or to experience diﬃculties in rolling-over their short-term debt and thus are given a larger weight. For
the alternative timings we create two measures as follows: i) if an episode takes place in year X, we use the debt
9the classiﬁcation of ﬁxed exchange rates in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) (hereafter RR), instead of
Kraay’s deﬁnition.14 This classiﬁcation leads to a somewhat diﬀerent set of episodes (see Table 1).
In particular, we have 17 new episodes that were previously not in the sample because according to
Kraay’s deﬁnition the exchange rate was too volatile. Similarly, we loose 13 episodes because the
exchange rate is relatively constant in Kraay’s window, but too volatile in RR’s longer window.
To investigate the sensitivity of our results we re-estimate all of our speciﬁcations using three
alternative samples: i) the episodes in RR’s sample, ii) the episodes in both samples, and iii) the
episodes in either sample. All of our results go through for all three samples (i.e., the conﬁrmation
of Kraay’s ﬁndings and our results with respect to short-term, long-term, and total debt).
A potential problem in our analysis arises from the possible endogeneity of monetary policy.
Although the objective functions and the constraints of both the monetary authorities and the
speculators are not necessarily common knowledge, some of the factors that aﬀect their behavior
are probably the same. If some of the common factors are not included as control variables, the
estimates presented above could be biased. Following Kraay, we instrument for monetary policy
using the percentage change in real reserves between t−1 and t−2, for a sub-sample of countries
with low levels of capital controls.15 Due to publication lags, this variable is not observed by
speculators and thus cannot be one of the factors that drives their actions (see discussion in Kraay
(2003), p. 314-315). It is, however, one of the factors that is expected to aﬀect monetary policy,
particularly in countries without alternative lines of defense, such as capital controls. The third
column of Table 6 reports estimation results for a regression of   MP2 on the percentage change in
reserves and all episode-speciﬁc fundamantals. As expected the instrument enters with a negative
sign and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The instrumental variables (IV) estimates,
presented in the last column of Table 6, are very similar to those presented earlier: the indicator
of monetary policy enters with a negative sign and is signiﬁcant at 5% and its interaction with
debt enters with a positive sign and is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.16 More importantly, the two
ratios at the end of X − 2,a n dii) if an episode takes place in the second half of a year, we use the debt ratios at
the end of X − 1, whereas if it takes place in the ﬁrst half of year X,w eu s et h ed e b tr a t i o sa tt h ee n do fX − 2.
14Both procedures require that a country’s exchange rate does not vary “too much” for a given period. There
are two main diﬀerences between them: i) RR use a ﬁve-year window, while Kraay uses a one-year window, and ii)
the cut-oﬀ point of what is considered “too much” is more conservative in Kraay than in RR (i.e., Kraay: 1% for
OECD and 2.5% for non-OECD; RR: 5% for de facto crawling bands and 2% for everything else).
15To eliminate countries with high levels of capital controls, we ranked the episodes in our sample according to
both de jure and de facto measures of ﬁnancial openness and eliminated those that ranked amongst the lowest 25%
for both measures. This resulted in the elimination of three episodes: Colombia 95:12, Brazil 97:11, and Russia
98:9. For the de jure measure we used an index of ﬁnancial openness from Chinn and Ito (2005). For the de facto
measure we used the ratio of gross private capital ﬂows to GDP, from the World Development Indicators.
16The IV estimation involves several steps as we have to instrument for both monetary policy and its interaction
with short-term debt. First, we regress  MP2 on the percentage change in reserves and all episode-speciﬁc funda-
mentals. We then interact the predicted values from this regression with the short-term debt ratio to construct a
10eﬀects cancel out when the short-term debt ratio is equal to 14.55% (i.e., this is the level of the
short-term debt ratio for which ∂P/∂Xi,t−k =0 ). The corresponding number using the estimates
from column (8) in Table 5 is 14.42%, suggesting that if there is endogeneity, it is probably not
important enough to cause a statistically and economically signiﬁcant bias. In fact, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity with a p-value equal to
0.85.
4 Conclusions
From a policy perspective, our ﬁndings imply a fundamental reconsideration of the role of monetary
policy during speculative attacks. A monetary policy tightening can only be used as a tool for crisis
prevention in countries with relatively low corporate debt. If short-term debt is high, monetary
policy will be ineﬀective and could even increase the probability that an attack results in a currency
crisis. From a long-term perspective, our results suggest that strengthening the balance-sheet
position of the corporate sector (i.e., limiting interest rate exposures) could be beneﬁcial in reducing
a country’s vulnerability to speculative attacks.
second instrument for the interaction term (following Wooldridge (2002), p. 237). Finally, using both instruments,
we perform Amemiya’s (1978) generalized least-squares procedure for probit models with endogenous regressors.
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Figure 1a: Short-term debt to total assets
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Figure 1b: The eﬀect of monetary policy for various levels of short-term debt
Figure 1b is constructed using the speciﬁcation of Table 3, column (5). It shows the percentage change in
the probability of a successful attack if   MP2 increases by 1-standard deviation (5%) from its sample mean
(12.70%), for diﬀerent levels of short-term debt. All other regressors are set at their sample mean. The
vertical lines at the left and the right end of the ﬁgure show the min and the max values of short-term debt
in the sample. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
13Table 1: Successful and failed speculative attacks during the period 1986:1-2002:12
Kraay (2003) Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)
Country Successful Failed Successful Failed
(+) (-) (+) (-)
Argentina 02:1 92:12, 95:3, 01:3
Brazil 99:1 97:11
Canada 90:5 92:10
Colombia 95:12 98:6
Denmark 93:8 87:2, 98:8, 89:11, 93:2 91:4 89:11
Finland 91:11 90:11, 91:5, 96:6, 98:3
France 93:11 91:6, 92:9
Indonesia 97:8 91:3
Korea 97:11, 00:12 89:11, 1996:8 00:12
Mexico 94:12, 98:9 94:5 98:9
Norway 86:5 92:12 86:5 91:3 92:12
Philippines 97:9 00:11 92:12, 95:4 00:11
Portugal 90:10 94:4
Russia 98:9 01:2 98:9
Slovakia 98:10 98:10
South Africa 98:7, 01:12 01:5 98:7, 01:12 01:5
Spain 95:3 87:5 92:10 89:12, 91:2, 95:8
Sweden 92:12 88:5, 90:2, 91:11, 98:2 98:2
Thailand 97:7 90:9, 92:9, 94:6
Turkey 98:3, 01:2
UK 92:9 92:2
Venezuela 95:12, 02:2 00:5, 01:9 95:12 97:6
Slovakia 1993:7 was also identiﬁed as a successful attack. However, this episode is excluded, since it is due to
the separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics.
14Table 2: Monetary Policy Interest Rates
Country Monetary Policy Interest Rate Identiﬁcation Source of Data
Argentina Interbank 7-day-middle rate Other Datastream
Brazil Financing overnight-middle rate Other Studies* Datastream
Canada Bank rate as at Wed-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Colombia Interbank overnight-middle rate Other Studies** Datastream
Denmark Discount-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Finland Key tender-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
France Intervention rate-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Indonesia SBI 90 day-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Korea Call overnight-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Mexico, 1994:5 Cetes 28-day min. auction-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Mexico, 1994:12 Cetes 28-day min. auction-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Mexico, 1998:9 Cetes 28-day avg. auction-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Norway, 1986:5 Daily interbank nominal-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Norway, 1992:12 Sight deposit nominal-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Philippines Interbank call loan rate-middle rate Other Studies*** Datastream
Portugal Central bank reference rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Russia Discount (reﬁnancing)-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Slovakia Basic NBS interest rate Central Bank-W Central Bank
South Africa Prime overdraft-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Spain Intervention-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Sweden Repo-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Thailand Repo 14-day-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
Turkey Interbank overnight-middle rate Central Bank-W Datastream
United Kingdom Base rate Central Bank-W Central Bank
Venezuela Discount Rate Central Bank-W IFS
Notes: Central Bank-W = Central Bank Website; Central Bank-C = Central Bank Contact by Email.
* Furman and Stiglitz (1998); ** Uribe (1998); *** Caporale, Cipollini and Demetriades (2005).
15Table 3: Indicators of Monetary Policy
Panel 1: Correlations
MP1 DISC1 MP2 DISC2   MP1  DISC1   MP2  DISC2
MP1 1.00
DISC1 0.97 1.00
MP2 0.98 0.54 1.00
DISC2 0.60 0.28 0.98 1.00
  MP1 0.36 0.42 0.31 0.14 1.00
 DISC1 0.41 0.39 0.11 0.16 0.77 1.00
  MP2 0.17 0.02 0.26 0.53 0.38 0.03 1.00
 DISC2 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.40 0.05 0.60 0.72 1.00
Panel 2: Summary statistics
mean st. dev. min max
MP1 0.07 0.56 -0.70 3.61
DISC1 -0.01 0.12 -0.55 0.28
MP2 0.08 0.56 -0.70 3.61
DISC2 0.01 0.14 -0.55 0.30
  MP1 0.38 1.91 -1.90 9.96
 DISC1 1.45 5.22 -3.10 27.61
  MP2 1.06 3.04 -4.64 12.08
 DISC2 2.20 6.46 -6.80 27.61
Panel 3: Monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack
Successful Failed
Number Tightening Number Tightening
MP1 19 0.53 25 0.56
DISC1 17 0.53 29 0.45
MP2 19 0.53 25 0.64
DISC2 17 0.53 29 0.66
  MP1 19 0.53 25 0.57
 DISC1 17 0.53 29 0.45
  MP2 19 0.53 25 0.64
 DISC2 17 0.53 29 0.66
16Table 4: Benchmark Regressions
Kraay’s timing Alternative timing
change % change change % change
DISC1 MP1  DISC1  MP1 DISC2 MP2  DISC2   MP2
Monetary policy 0.27 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.36 0.07 0.04 -0.02
(1.82) (0.42) (0.04) (0.13) (1.59) (0.38) (0.03) (0.08)
0.01 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.02
Initial level of spread -0.35 1.41 -0.29 3.12
(1.69) (1.50) (2.48) (2.10)
-0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.23
Debt to total assets 0.53 2.75 -0.04 3.80 0.60 2.77 0.96 3.90
(5.03) (4.82) (5.03) (5.48) (4.89) (4.82) (5.09) (5.08)
0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.08
Exchange rate growth 30.90 11.16 31.36 15.26 31.56 11.41 32.66 -8.92
(32.65) (31.04) (34.83) (35.77) (32.94) (30.96) (37.09) (33.69)
0.09 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.10 -0.03
Reserves to imports 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.11
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.14 0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.13
IMF loans to quota 1.09** 0.42* 1.08** 0.44* 1.12** 0.43* 1.18** 0.32
(0.46) (0.25) (0.45) (0.26) (0.54) (0.24) (0.54) (0.24)
0.27** 0.17* 0.26** 0.18* 0.27** 0.17* 0.29** 0.13
Deviations from GDP trend -7.43 -3.14 -5.05 -5.94 -7.91 -3.30 -7.62 -2.35
(8.60) (5.91) (8.52) (5.89) (8.61) (5.77) (8.12) (6.87)
-0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04
Current account to GDP -8.06 -3.30 -7.56 1.40 -8.12 -3.31 -8.09 -2.01
(5.09) (4.43) (4.88) (4.85) (5.05) (4.44) (5.10) (4.40)
-0.14* -0.07 -0.13* 0.03 -.014* -0.07 -0.14* -0.04
Growth rate of exports 0.63 -0.79 0.81 0.10 0.74 -0.75 1.19 0.07
(3.16) (3.13) (3.38) (3.61) (3.14) (3.12) (3.17) (3.89)
0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.00
Goodness of ﬁt
Pseudo R-Squared 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.15
Predicted=1, Actual=1 52.9 47.4 47.1 47.4 52.9 47.4 52.9 52.6
Predicted=1, Actual=0 10.3 12.0 6.9 21.7 10.3 12.0 10.3 20.0
Predicted=0, Actual=0 89.7 88.0 93.1 78.3 89.7 88.0 89.7 80.0
Predicted=0, Actual=1 47.1 52.6 52.9 52.6 47.1 52.6 47.1 47.4
Observations 46 44 46 42 46 44 46 44
P0 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.46 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.44
For each regressor we report the estimated coeﬃcient from the probit model, the robust standard error of the
estimated coeﬃcient, and the change in probability of a successful attack if a regressor increases by 1-standard
deviation from its sample mean. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
P0 is the probability of a successful attack if all regressors are evaluated at their sample mean. To determine
whether the model predicts a successful attack (i.e., predicted=1), we use 0.5 as a cut-oﬀ point.
17Table 5: Benchmark Regressions plus interaction of monetary policy and debt
Kraay’s timing Alternative timing
change % change change % change
DISC1 MP1  DISC1  MP1 DISC2 MP2  DISC2   MP2
Monetary policy 2.24 -2.26 0.12 -0.39 -3.48 -12.38 -0.58* -2.19***
(4.35) (2.55) (0.19) (0.55) (5.33) (9.99) (0.31) (0.61)
0.11 -0.36* 0.24 -0.26 -0.16 -0.48*** -0.35*** -0.33***
Debt to total assets 0.83 2.51 0.46 2.73 -0.32 -0.20 -4.25 -9.63
(5.01) (4.80) (5.43) (5.52) (4.72) (4.99) (6.82) (6.61)
0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.15*
Monetary policy*debt -18.89 17.49 -0.47 2.42 35.40 90.65 5.70** 15.14***
(37.37) (17.98) (1.58) (2.65) (44.52) (70.99) (2.89) (4.30)
-0.08 0.45 -0.11 0.32 0.20 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.67***
Exchange rate growth 30.21 10.92 31.11 19.16 34.64 11.25 28.68 -7.26
(32.90) (30.12) (35.07) (34.18) (32.32) (27.49) (34.46) (30.93)
0.09 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.08 -0.02
Reserves to imports 0.03 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.01
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.01
IMF loans to quota 1.18** 0.35 1.10** 0.47* 0.99* 0.20 0.89** 0.05
(0.55) (0.25) (0.45) (0.27) (0.52) (0.25) (0.46) (0.25)
0.29** 0.15 0.27** 0.19* 0.24* 0.08 0.22* 0.02
Deviations from GDP trend -6.81 -3.43 -4.89 -5.76 -8.86 0.91 -9.64 2.24
(8.78) (5.81) (8.60) (5.74) (8.58) (6.26) (7.88) (8.34)
-0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 0.01 -0.11 0.03
Current account to GDP -8.67 -3.15 -7.94 1.20 -8.10* -5.24 -5.00 -6.59
(5.29) (4.41) (4.91) (4.77) (4.91) (4.47) (4.82) (5.49)
-0.15* -0.06 -0.14* 0.02 -0.14* -0.11 -0.09 -0.11
Growth rate of exports 0.27 -0.28 0.68 0.53 1.95 1.10 6.57 9.73*
(3.38) (3.24) (3.49) (3.62) (3.65) (3.41) (4.21) (5.26)
0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.27*
Initial level of spread -0.42 1.27 1.88 4.18
(1.70) (1.46) (2.68) (3.30)
-0.02 0.10 0.08 0.31
Goodness of Fit
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.29 0.37
Predicted=1, Actual=1 41.2 47.4 47.1 52.6 47.1 52.6 58.8 73.7
Predicted=1, Actual=0 10.3 12.0 6.9 8.7 10.3 8.0 6.9 20.0
Predicted=0, Actual=0 89.7 88.0 93.1 91.3 89.7 92.0 93.1 80.0
Predicted=0, Actual=1 58.8 52.6 52.9 47.4 52.9 47.4 41.2 26.3
Observations 46 44 46 42 46 44 46 44
P0 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.33
For each regressor we report the estimated coeﬃcient from the probit model, the robust standard error of the
estimated coeﬃcient, and the change in probability of a successful attack if a regressor increases by 1-standard
deviation from its sample mean. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
P0 is the probability of a successful attack if all regressors are evaluated at their sample mean. To determine
whether the model predicts a successful attack (i.e., predicted=1), we use 0.5 as a cut-oﬀ point.
18Table 6: Robustness checks and instrumental variable estimates
Probit Probit OLS IV Probit
Monetary policy -1.16** 0.05 -2.62**
(0.47) (0.18) (1.33)
-0.38*** 0.05 -0.35**
Percentage change in real reserves -0.07**
(0.03)
S-debt to total assets 5.97 -14.60
(13.20) (13.77)
-0.22
L-debt to total assets 2.70
(2.80)
0.12
T-debt to total assets -2.23
(3.51)
-0.07
Monetary policy*corresponding debt ratio 3.91** -0.45 18.04**
(1.59) (1.14) (8.22)
0.62*** -0.08 0.65***
Exchange rate growth -5.91 -11.09 -55.24 -15.35
(31.54) (34.84) (36.67) (56.84)
-0.02 -0.03 -0.04
Reserves to imports -0.07 -0.11 0.13 0.07
(0.09) (0.08) (0.16) (0.19)
-0.07 -0.13 0.08
IMF loans to quota 0.27 0.30 -0.27 -0.09
(0.24) (0.25) (0.41) (0.46)
0.11 0.12 -0.03
Deviations from GDP trend 0.82 -3.96 44.62*** 8.14
(8.43) (7.34) (13.31) (25.23)
0.01 -0.06 0.13
Current account to GDP -3.32 -4.18 -8.28 -8.98
(4.60) (4.32) (11.50) (10.62)
-0.06 -0.08 -0.16
Growth rate of exports 3.98 0.91 -20.00* 11.89
(4.88) (3.86) (10.96) (10.05)
0.11 0.03 0.33
Initial level of spread 3.55 3.54 1.98 5.82
(2.73) (2.31) (4.09) (5.35)
0.27 0.26* 0.38
Goodness of Fit
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.24 0.16 0.38 0.15
Predicted=1, Actual=1 63.2 52.6 - 42.1
Predicted=1, Actual=0 12.0 12.0 - 8.0
Predicted=0, Actual=0 88.0 88.0 - 92.0
Predicted=0, Actual=1 36.8 47.4 - 57.9
Observations 44 44 41 41
P0 0.38 0.45 - 0.35
The ﬁrst two columns report results from a Probit model. The third column reports OLS results where the dependent
variable is   MP2. The fourth column reports GLS results from an instrumental variables Probit model. For each
regressor we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the robust standard error. In the ﬁrst, second, and fourth columns
we also report the change in the probability of a successful attack if a regressor increases by 1-st. deviation from its
sample mean. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. S-debt, L-debt, and
T-debt indicate short-term, long-term, and total debt, respectively. P0 is the probability of a successful attack if all
all regressors are evaluated at their sample mean. To determine whether the model predicts a successful attack
(i.e., predicted=1), we use 0.5 as a cut-oﬀ point.
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